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INEQUALITIES IN CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC
SCHOOL SYSTEM: THE UNDERMINING OF
SERRANO V. PRIEST AND THE NEED FOR A
MINIMUM STANDARDS SYSTEM OF
EDUCATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy years have passed since United States Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that "[t]hree generations
of imbeciles are enough."' Yet, left uncorrected, the inequalities in
California's public school system will result in more than three gen-
erations of imbeciles in some districts.
The California public school system, in its present form, is fun-
damentally undesirable and socially intolerable due to the inequali-
ties amongst the school districts as to amounts available for direct
educational expenditures such as books and teacher salaries. Despite
the California Supreme Court holdings in the 1971 case of Serrano v.
Pries? ("Serrano 1"), and the 1976 case of Serrano v. Priest3 ("Ser-
rano IT'), that the California Constitution requires equal funding for
public schools, this Comment will show that inequalities persist in
school funding and in the quality of education provided to students
within the various districts.
Serrano I, as affirmed by Serrano 11,4 held that the school fund-
ing system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and of the California Constitution,5 that education is a
fundamental interest,6 and that wealth is a suspect class.7  The
1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
2. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
3. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
4. See id. at 776, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
5. See Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
6. See id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
7. See id. at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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decision squarely denounced the then present system, whereby the
state delegated a lion's share of educational funding to the school
districts, while the only local source of revenue for such districts was
8property taxes.
This Comment contends that Serrano I and Serrano II have
failed to achieve their intended purpose and discusses the current
causes of inequality in California's public school system. Addition-
ally, this Comment focuses on wealth-related deficiencies which af-
fect not only minorities, but people of all races.
Section II reviews the historical development of educational
inequalities, as reflected in both Federal and California case law. It
concludes by examining the structural underpinnings which are nec-
essary to understand the nature of these inequalities.
Section III offers examples of discrepancies which presently
exist in California's public school system. It then highlights the lack
of equality in the quality of education provided by the public school
system to California students. Such discrepancies are evident upon
visiting the different schools and observing the great disparities in
facilities. Equally revealing are the types of materials dispersed to
the students and the resources available to those schools for expen-
ditures, such as teacher salaries.
Section IV identifies the causes of the inequalities that persist in
California's public school system despite the mandates of Serrano I
and Serrano I. Specifically discussed are the passage of Proposition
13, the Gann limits in Proposition 4, the ability of local districts to
raise funds through their own initiatives, and the unequal amount of
funds various school districts expend for books, teacher salaries,
maintenance, and security.
Section V sets forth a legislative proposal to minimize the ine-
qualities in California's public school system. This proposal ac-
knowledges that true equality can never be achieved in a democratic
and capitalistic political system. Moreover, it rejects the theory that
there should be equality in funding amongst the school districts, fo-
cusing instead on minimum standards of education. The proposal di-
rects the legislature's attention to implementing a minimum standard
8. See id. at 599-601, 487 P.2d at 1251-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611-13.
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of education required of all public schools, and to providing the
appropriate funding necessary to achieve these minimum standards.
Section VI concludes by advocating that unless the legislature
implements corrective measures to accomplish the goals of Serrano I
and Serrano II, California's schools may continue to create more
than three generations of poorly educated students. Initially, this
condition will affect the poorer sections of our communities, which
consist of people from all races, but it will ultimately impose tre-
mendous costs on society as a whole.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INEQUALITY IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN BOTH FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA COURTS
Given the importance and complexity of the current problems
plaguing the California public school system, it is necessary to trace
the foundational structure of these problems through an examination
of federal and state authorities.
A. Equality of Education in the Federal Courts
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court announced its infa-
mous holding of "separate but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson.9 In
Plessy, the Court considered whether a Louisiana statute, which
founded a distinction upon race, destroyed the legal equality of the
races concerned. 10 Affirming the Louisiana court's holding that the
statute requiring separation of blacks and whites in a railcar was con-
stitutional, the United States Supreme Court paved the road for the
proposition of "separate but equal."" The Court reasoned that "we
cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separa-
tion of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress
requiring separate schools for colored children."'12 Hence, the Court
concluded that the statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
13
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Seeid. at 543.
11. See id. at 552.
12. Id. at 550-51.
13. See id.
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However, the only part of the Plessy holding that held true was
"separate," as the portion that required "equality" was mere fiction.
This proposition is evidenced by lower court cases such as Corbin v.
County School Board.'4 In Corbin, the plaintiffs claimed that the
school board engaged in racial discrimination by failing to provide
equal facilities for segregated elementary and high schools. 5 Also,
they claimed that the Board's failure to arrange equal transportation
to and from school for the minority students and its refusal to enforce
compulsory school attendance laws of the State of Virginia against
minorities, while enforcing them against white students, constituted
racial discrimination.' 6 The court held that the deviations appeared
to be inconsequential and not discriminatory, and that the facilities
provided to the black students were comparable to those provided to
the white students. 17 In doing so, the court seemed to imply that the
standard was "separate but comparable," rather than "separate but
equal."
Finally, in Brown v. Board of Education,'8 the United States Su-
preme Court overruled the Plessy doctrine of "separate but equal"
and held that racial segregation of students was unconstitutional.' 9
In Brown, the Court answered affirmatively the question of whether
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even if physical facilities and other "tangible" factors are eqiual, de-
prives minority children of equal educational opportunities. 2' This
holding marked the elimination of statutory segregation in the public
school systems.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, manda-
tory school desegregation programs gave rise to the phenomenon of
"white flight," whereby Caucasians would abandon inner city areas
and move to the suburbs. 21 The white population that fled to the
suburbs feared that their children would be forced to attend schools
14. 84 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Va. 1949).
15. See id. at 254.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 258.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See id. at 495.
20. See id. at 493.
21. See JoAnn Grozuczak Goedert, Comment, Jenkins v. Missouri: The
Future of Interdistrict School Desegregation, 76 GEO. L.J. 1867, 1878 (1988).
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with minorities, whom they saw as inferior, and whom they felt
would adversely affect their children's education.22 White flight un-
dermined desegregation because inner city schools became even
more identifiably black.23 Such migration eroded the tax base of
districts, drained the school systems of their financial resources, and
exacted further inequalities between districts.24 An article in the Los
Angeles Times noted that
[w]hite flight is a major reason why Los Angeles pub-
lic education is in a financial crunch. With their children
securely enrolled in private schools, middle-class whites are
joining with childless adults, especially the elderly, to make
it more difficult for the public-school system to obtain ad-
ditional funds through bond issues or outright tax increases.
Partly as a result, the educational needs of students who
have no alternative but the public system are imperiled.25
In Missouri v. Jenkins,26 the United States Supreme Court held
that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to order state allocation of fi-
nancial resources to urban districts in an attempt to lure white stu-
dents back to those schools. 27 Apparently, courts could mandate de-
segregation within a district, but were powerless to enforce
desegregation between two districts.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1973, dealt a severe blow
to the proponents of equality amongst the public school systems in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.28 In Rodri-
guez, the plaintiffs claimed that Texas's system of financing public
education, which relied principally on local property taxes, violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.9 In a five to four
decision, the Court held that there is no fundamental right to equality
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Mark A. Neubauer, None Dare Call Year-Round 'Racist,' L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1990, at B7.
26. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
27. See id. at 92.
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. See id. at 5-6, 9-10.
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in public school education.30 Of course, the first thought that comes
to mind is "Did they really say that?"
The Court was reluctant to eliminate local taxation for local ex-
penditures as an unconstitutional means of financing education.
Through its holding, the Court intended to foreclose similar argu-
ments by future plaintiffs with respect to other services customarily
financed through local property taxes, such as police, fire protection,
hospitals, and various other public utilities.31 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stewart recognized that "[t]he method of financing
public schools in Texas, as in almost every other State, has resulted
in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic
and unjust. ' 32 He did not, however, conclude that the financing
method lacked constitutional muster.
33
Despite the financial disparities that exist between the school
districts, federal courts have endorsed as constitutional the various
methods adopted by the states in funding public schools primarily
through local property taxes. The current position of federal case
law on the issue of inequality in public school systems has shifted the
matter to the state courts, with each state's respective constitution
providing the basis for such litigation.
34
B. Equality in Education in the California Courts
1. California's constitutional provisions
California's constitution contains various sections concerning
education. 35 Article IX, section 1 of the California Constitution pro-
vides that "[a] general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people,
the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion
of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.
3 6
30. See id. at 37.
31. See id. at 54.
32. Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
33. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
34. See John Dayton, An Anatomy of School Funding Litigation, 77 EDUC.
L. REP. 627, 627 (1992).
35. See CAL. CONST. art. IX.
36. Id. art. IX, § 1.
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The state legislature bears the responsibility of providing public
education as well as financial support to the public school system.
37
In addition, the California Constitution specifically provides that
"[t]he State Board of Education shall adopt textbooks for use in
grades one through eight throughout the State, to be furnished with-
out cost as provided by statute."
38
Additional sections of the California Constitution which have
been utilized in litigation over inequalities in the public school sys-
tem include the Equal Protection Clause 39 and the right to safe
schools.
40
2. Serrano I
The landmark California Supreme Court decision addressing
inequalities in public school funding is Serrano L41 In Serrano 1, the
plaintiffs asserted that California's public schools were maintained
by a financing plan that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as
various provisions of the California Constitution.42 Specifically, the
plaintiffs contended that the schools' reliance on local property taxes
caused substantial disparities between school districts as to the
amount of funding available per pupil.43
Plaintiffs' primary allegations were that the financing scheme
"A. Makes the quality of education for school age chil-
dren in California, including Plaintiff Children, a function
of the wealth of the children's parents and neighbors, as
measured by the tax base of the school district in which said
children reside, and
"B. Makes the quality of education for school age chil-
dren.., a function of the geographic accident of the school
district in which said children reside, and
37. See id. art. IX, §§ 5-6.
38. Id. art. IX, § 7.5.
39. See id. art. I, § 7(a).
40. See id. art. I, § 28(c).
41. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
42. See id. at 589-90, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
43. See id.
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"C. Fails to take account of any of the variety of edu-
cational needs of the several school districts (and of the
children therein) of the State of California, and
"D. Provides students living in some school districts of
the State with material advantages over students in other
school districts in selecting and pursuing their educational
goals, and
"E. Fails to provide children of substantially equal age,
aptitude, motivation, and ability with substantially equal
educational resources, and
"F. Perpetuates marked differences in the quality of
educational services, equipment and other facilities which
exist among the public school districts of the State as a re-
sult of inequitable apportionment of State resources in past
years.
"G. The use of the 'school district' as a unit for the dif-
ferential allocation of educational funds bears no reasonable
relation to the California legislative purpose of providing
equal educational opportunity for all school children within
the State.
"H. The part of the State financing scheme which per-
mits each school district to retain and expend within that
district all of the property tax collected within that district
bears no reasonable relation to any educational objective or
need.
"I. A disproportionate number of school children who
are black children, children with Spanish surnames, [and]
children belonging to other minority groups reside in school
districts in which a relatively inferior educational opportu-
nity is provided."44
The California Supreme Court reviewed the statistics presented
by the plaintiffs and acknowledged that in the 1968-69 school year,
disparities existed among districts.45 For example, during that school
year, Baldwin Park Unified expended only $577.49 per pupil for
education, whereas Beverly Hills Unified spent $1,231.72 per
44. Id. at 590 n.1, 487 P.2d at 1244-45 n.1, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05 n.1.
45. See id. at 594, 487 P.2d at 1247-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
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pupil.46 Furthermore, the court noted that during that time, the real
property assessed valuation per child in Baldwin Park was only
$3,706.00, whereas in Beverly Hills, the corresponding amount was
$50,885.00, a ratio of 1 to 13.47 The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs' contention, that the school financing scheme classified on the
basis of wealth, was irrefutable.
48
In addition to noting the obvious statistical discrepancies, the
court recognized that due to higher assessed property values,
wealthier districts could offer a higher level of education for their
children than poorer districts, while imposing a lower tax rate.
49
Meanwhile, poorer districts were financially crippled from raising
tax rates high enough to match the educational levels provided by
wealthier districts.50 As the court put it, "affluent districts can have
their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education
for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by con-,,51
trast, have no cake at all. Thus, the court concluded that "the
school financing system discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a
district and its residents."
52
Having recognized wealth-based discrimination, the court in
Serrano I focused its attention on whether education was a funda-
mental interest. 53 The court stated that "first, education is a major
determinant of an individual's chances for economic and social suc-
cess in our competitive society; second, education is a unique influ-
ence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in
political and community life."'5 4 The court compared the right to an
education with the rights of defendants in criminal cases and the
right to vote.5 5 The court described the latter two of these rights as
fundamental interests to which the court affords protection against
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 599-600, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
51. Id. at 600, 487 P.2d at 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
52. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
55. See id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
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wealth-based discrimination. 56, The court recognized that education
has greater social significance than simply providing criminal defen-
dants with free transcripts or a court-appointed attorney. 57 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that education makes voting rights more
meaningful. 58 Therefore, the court concluded that education is a
fundamental interest.
59
After determining that education is a fundamental interest and
that wealth is a suspect class, the California Supreme Court applied
the strict scrutiny test to the California public school financing sys-
tem.60 The court found that the financing system was not necessary
to achieve any compelling state interest, thereby failing the strict
scrutiny test.61 Accordingly, the court held that the system violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and of
the California Constitution. 62 However, the court's decision was not
a final judgment on the merits because it held only that the plaintiffs'
allegations were legally sufficient to reverse the trial court's judg-
ment.63 As such, the court remanded the case with directions to
overrule the demurrers and allow the defendants time to answer.
64
3. Serrano II
Between Serrano I and the time that the California Supreme
Court revisited the issue of inequalities in California's public schools
in Serrano II,65 the United States Supreme Court rendered a contrary
decision in a case strikingly similar to Serrano L 66 In that decision,
which concerned the financing of public education in Texas, the
Court held that education is not a fundamental right.67 Reaffirming
its decision in Serrano I, the California Supreme Court carefully
pointed out in Serrano II that it based its prior decision in Serrano I
56. See id.
57. See id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
58. See id. at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
59. See id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
60. See id. at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
64. See id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
65. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
66. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. See id. at 37.
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not only on the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution,
but also on similar provisions of the California Constitution.68 The
court unequivocally indicated that Serrano I was still the law in Cali-
fornia despite the contrary decision by the United States Supreme
Court.
6 9
In Serrano I1, the California Supreme Court noted that the leg-
islature, after the court's decision in Serrano 1, had implemented two
bills, Senate Bill No. 90 (S.B. 90) and Assembly Bill No. 1267 (A.B.
1267),7° which mandated important changes in California's public
school financing system. Recognizing that these changes were sig-
nificant, the court nevertheless held that they did not alter the basic
concept underlying the California public school system known as the
"foundation approach., 71 This approach insures "a certain guaran-
teed dollar amount for the education of each child in each school
district., 72 The most influential change brought about by S.B. 90 and
A.B. 1267 was the dramatic increase in the foundation level.73 The
dollars per average daily attendance (ADA)74 rose from $355 per
ADA to $765 per ADA for elementary school students, and from
$488 per ADA to $950 per ADA for high school students, as imple-
mented for the fiscal year 1973-74.75
Additional changes resulting from S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 con-
cerned revenue limits, whereby more affluent districts were bound by
a maximum amount they could spend on a per pupil basis.76 These
wealthier districts were also restricted in the amounts they could levy
through permissive overrides, which do not require voter approval,
as additional taxes to pay for subsequent years' increases in expen-
ditures.77 The districts could, however, counter the restriction
68. See Serrano 11, 18 Cal. 3d at 776, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
374.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 736, 557 P.2d at 931, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
71. See id. at 741, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 742, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
74. ADA is computed by adding the daily attendance for the whole year
and then dividing that sum by the number of school days in the year. See id. at
738 n.8, 557 P.2d at 932 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 348 n.8.
75. See id. at 742, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
76. See id. at 742-43, 557 P.2d at 935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
77. See id. at 743-44, 557 P.2d at 935-36, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
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78imposed on permissive overrides by a majority vote. Moreover,
permissive overrides were available for special purposes such as
capital outlays.79 Finally, S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 left undisturbed the
basic aid, via which each district received $125 per ADA, regardless
of its needs.
80
Although S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 reorganized the financing
scheme of the California public schools, the three main elements of
the system after the changes regarding basic aid, equalization aid,
and tax rate limitations and overrides, precluded the elimination of
the unconstitutional features identified in Serrano L8 1 In reaching
this conclusion, the court found that the revenue limit feature of the
new law was replete with severe defects.8 2 By taking the 1972-73
revenues as its base figure, the law perpetuated inequities resulting
from property tax base differentials.8 3 The court stated that under the
new law, even after twenty years, "there will continue to be a sub-
stantial inequality between... districts" and that "the system will
continue to generate school revenue in proportion to the wealth of
the individual district."
8 4
The court in Serrano II discussed various workable, practical,
and feasible alternative methods of financing California's public
school system which included:
(1) full state funding, with the imposition of a statewide
property tax; (2) consolidation of the present 1,067 school
districts into about five hundred districts, with boundary
realignments to equalize assessed valuations of real prop-
erty among all school districts; (3) retention of the present
school district boundaries but the removal of commercial
and industrial property from local taxation for school pur-
poses and taxation of such property at the state level; (4)
school district power equalizing[,] which has as its essential
ingredient the concept that school districts could choose to
78. See id. at 743, 557 P.2d at 936, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
79. See id. at 743-44, 557 P.2d at 936, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
80. See id. at 744, 745 n.17, 557 P.2d at 936, 937 n.17, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
352, 353 n.17.
81. See id. at 744, 557 P.2d at 936-37, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
82. See id., 557 P.2d at 937, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 744-45, 557 P.2d at 937, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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spend at different levels but for each level of expenditure
chosen the tax effort would be the same for each school
district choosing such level whether it be a high-wealth or a
low-wealth district; (5) vouchers; and (6) some combination
of two or more of the above.
85
Despite implementation of S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267, the court ul-
timately concluded that California's public school financing system
violated the Equal Protection provisions of the United States and
California Constitutions.86 Reaffirming its prior decision in Serrano
I and incorporating the trial court's judgment,87 the California Su-
preme Court "set a period of six years from the date of entry of
judgment as a reasonable time for bringing the system into constitu-
tional compliance." 88 Additionally, the court preserved the operation
of the existing system until compliance had been achieved.89 Ini-
tially, the court required wealth-related disparities between school
districts in per-pupil expenditures to be reduced to insignificant dif-
ferences. 90 According to the court, this meant amounts considerably
less than $100 per pupil.91
4. Serrano Jlrevisited
In 1982, a group of plaintiffs again filed the Serrano case in the
California Superior Court in Los Angeles County.92 The plaintiffs
claimed that California's school financing system still did not com-
ply with the earlier order of Serrano I. 93 Superior Court Justice
Lester Olsen, however, ruled that the system did comport with the
judgment in that case. 94 The court reasoned that the $100 band re-
ferred to in Serrano II, if to be used at all, must be adjusted for infla-
tion.95 The court stated that absolute equality is neither practically
85. Id. at 747, 557 P.2d at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
86. See id. at 776, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
87. See id. at 776-77, 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
88. Id. at 749, 557 P.2d at 940, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 749 n.21, 557 P.2d at 940 n.21, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.21.
91. See id.
92. See PAUL M. GOLDFINGER, REVENUES AND LIMITS: A GUIDE TO
SCHOOL FINANCE IN CALIFORNIA 9 (1997).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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possible, nor is it required under Serrano IL.96 Therefore, the court
held that no further reduction in funding differences was constitu-
tionally required.97
Due to this decision, the state eliminated the revenue limit
squeeze it had imposed on the wealthier districts, and provided equal
inflation increases for all districts of the same type.98 The Court of
Appeal affirmed the Superior Court decision.99 However, the plain-
tiffs pursued their appeal of the decision. 00 In 1989, the parties en-
tered into a settlement agreement dismissing the plaintiffs' ap-
peals.
101
In the early 1990s, ABC Unified School District, joined by more
than 100 other California school districts, filed a new lawsuit against
the State of California. 10 2 Unfortunately for the students of those
districts, the plaintiffs withdrew their action in 1993 due to a lack of
funds. 0 3 These subsequent cases suggest that the California courts
are now of the opinion that the state's public school system is in con-
formity with the decision rendered in Serrano II.
Based on the decisions in the aforementioned cases, it appears
that the California judiciary's purpose was to narrow disparities in
educational expenditures between the various districts so as to com-
port with the Equal Protection Clause.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF EQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC
SCHOOL SYSTEM
Prior to Serrano II, California ranked 18th in the nation for its
expenditures on education per ADA during the 1975-76 school
year. I°4 Since then, California's ranking has declined to a record low
of forty-first out of the fifty states during the 1994-95 school year.1
05
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 11.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 8 tbl.1-1.
105. Seeid.
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Table 1 below illustrates a comparison of the 1995-96 revenues
and expenditures per ADA of various schools in Los Angeles
County. The data presented in the table indicate that the difference
of more than $100 between districts, defined as a significant dispar-
ity in Serrano 11,106 has not yet been eliminated irrespective of any
adjustments for inflation.
TABLE 1.107
1995-1996 1995-1996
DISTRICTNAME 99- REVENUES PER EXPENDITURES
ADA PER ADA
ABC 21,570 4,443.49 4,414.99
Acton-Agua 2,078 4,174.89 3,772.98
Dulce
Baldwin Park 15,776 4,159.83 4,027.42
Beverly Hills 5,138 6,228.89 6,014.06
Bonita 9,963 4,620.36 4,589.63
Claremont 6,446 4,878.94 4,770.88
Compton 27,381 4,653.09 4,379.03
Culver City 5,494 4,832.26 4,750.70
Downey 18,058 4,516.51 4,166.42
Duarte 4,555 4,313.74 3,960.52
Los Angeles 624,350 5,464.34 5,282.76
Lynwood 15,110 4,337.17 4,098.94
Manhattan 4,958 4,933.96 5,087.01
Beach ______
Pasadena 21,735 5,038.54 4,944.54
Pomona 29,784 4,482.38 4,027.28
106. See Serrano I1, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 749 n.21, 557 P.2d 929, 940 n.21, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345, 356 n.21 (1976) (defining "insignificant differences" as
"amounts considerably less than $100.00 per pupil") (emphasis added).
107. 1995-96 LOS ANGELES COUNTY OFF. OF EDUC. ANN. FIN. REP. 20-29
tbl.4 (1997) [hereinafter Los ANGELES COUNTY, 1995-96 REPORT].
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The numbers presented in this table clearly demonstrate the ex-
istence of inequalities amongst the various school districts. For ex-
ample, the Beverly Hills District's expenditures per ADA during the
1995-96 school year were 159% greater than those of the Acton-
Agua Dulce District. In addition, revenues per ADA of the Beverly
Hills District were 150% higher than those of Baldwin Park District.
Conditions of overcrowding and violence in the Los Angeles
public schools have induced numerous parents to enroll their chil-
dren in private schools.' 08 Notwithstanding the high cost of private
education, applications are at an all time high.10 9
Despite California's constitutional guarantee,"10 book shortages
caused by inadequate funding plague a number of needy districts in-
cluding Los Angeles Unified."' Moreover, students in urban dis-
tricts fare worse than their suburban counterparts.1 2 Although text-
books can cost $45 or more, Los Angeles Unified reserves only $26
per student each year for textbooks. 1 3 This amount falls far below
even the low statewide average of $33.114 Reasons cited for book
shortages include the failure to adjust for inflation the levels of state
funding for education, lost books, evolving educational methods, and
individual school discretion in the allocation of funds.115
While many states apportion 2% of funding to book purchases,
California districts devote a mere 0.75%.116 Moreover, Los Angeles
Unified spends only 0.5% of its funds on books. 1 7 In addition,
broad differences persist as to the amount each school within a dis-
trict allocates to book purchases. For example, San Fernando High
School allots only $13 per student in contrast to the $66 per student
108. See Lois Timnick, Public School Woes Prompt Parents to Consider
Options, L.A. TIMES (Westside ed.), Jan. 24, 1993, at J1.
109. See id.
110. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 7.5.
111. See Amy Pyle, Book Shortage Plagues L.A. Unified, L.A. TIMES, July
28, 1997, at Al.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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expended for North Hollywood High School's magnet program for
the highly gifted." 8
Due to public criticism and outrage, Los Angeles Unified re-
cently approved a $6 million budget increase for textbooks." 9 How-
ever, this amounts to merely $4 more annually for each elementary
school student, $8 for each middle school student, and $13 for each
high school student. 120 Even the school district acknowledged that
the increase was insufficient to offset the $40 average cost of text-
books.1
2 '
These indicators plainly evidence that the underlying goals of
Serrano I and Serrano II, to equalize funding among public school
districts and to improve the quality of education, have not yet been
achieved.
IV. CAUSES OF INEQUALITIES IN CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC SCHOOL
SYSTEM DESPITE THE MANDATE OF SERRANO V. PRIEST
Numerous factors have affected the holding of Serrano I. The
primary factors which are discussed in this section include Proposi-
tion 13,122 the Gann limits in Proposition 4, 12 the ability of individ-
ual sponsors to contribute funds to their children's schools, and the
varying amounts expended by districts for items such as security and
maintenance. Other influences, such as parental income and educa-
tion level, local crime statistics, and general local economic condi-
tions may likewise affect the quality of education provided to stu-
dents. However, these issues will not be examined in this Comment.
A. Proposition 13
In September of 1977, Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly
Bill No. 65 (A.B. 65) in an effort to comply with the $100 allowable
discrepancy range delineated in Serrano I. 24  Targeting school
118. See id.
119. See Amy Pyle, L.A. Unified OKs $6 Million for Textbooks, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1997, at B1.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. See infra Part IV.B.
124. See William A. Fisehel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. &
POL. 607, 611 (1996).
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financing procedures, A.B. 65 was scheduled to take effect in 1978-
79. 125 The bill afforded aid to property-poor districts by transferring
a portion of the property taxes collected from more affluent districts
to the state.126 In turn, the state would distribute these funds to the
property-poor districts. 1
27
Prior to implementation of A.B. 65, however, California voters
passed a ballot initiative called Proposition 13 by a two-to-one mar-
gin.128 Proposition 13 permanently restricted property tax rates to a
maximum of 1% of the assessed property value of individual proper-
ties and mandated a rollback in all property assessments to 1975 lev-
els. 2 9 Also, reassessment to market value was only permitted upon
sale of the property. 130 In addition, Proposition 13 limited the annual
increase of assessed property value during non-sale years to a maxi-
mum of 2%.'1'
Further curtailing the state's and the districts' abilities to garner
educational funding based on property values, "Proposition 13 re-
quired a two-thirds majority of local voters to adopt special, non-
property local taxes, and it forbade any statewide property taxes,
which had earlier been discussed as a remedy for Serrano [J].
' 132
Since Proposition 13 was a constitutional amendment, it superseded
A.B. 65, which was merely a legislative bill.
133
Scholars have noted that "the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978
definitely put education into a financial straightjacket."' 134 Proposi-
tion 13 slashed property taxes by an average of 60%, which caused
many school districts to become dependent on state aid. 135 In addi-
tion, "revenue limits" funding 136 was drastically reorganized by
125. See Lawrence 0. Picus, Cadillacs or Chevrolets?: The Evolution of
State Control over School Finance Reform in California, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 33,
42 (1991).
126. See Fischel, supra note 124, at 611.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 612.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. GOLDFINGER, supra note 92, at 7.
135. See id. at5.
136. Revenue limits are defined as "[tihe amount of revenue that a district
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Proposition 13.137 As a result, 100% of a school district's marginal
income and all subsequent increases in its revenue limit must be de-
rived from state aid.'
13
Consequences of Proposition 13 included the transfer of the
burden of inflation related educational cost increases from the local
property taxpayers to the state, as well as instability in educational
funding caused by increased dependency of the school districts on
state aid.139 In addition, school budgets are currently affected by ju-
dicial and federal mandates concerning welfare, Medicare, and/or
Social Security which compete for the state's budget.14 Meanwhile,
few counties have succeeded in obtaining more than two-thirds of its
voters to approve a special tax designed to fund education.
141
By design, A.B. 65 sought to aid property-poor school districts,
pursuant to Serrano II, through redistribution of the funds generated
by property-rich districts. 142 In actuality, A.B. 65 compromised both
the impoverished and affluent districts by providing voters with an
incentive to pass Proposition 13 which reduced the property tax
revenues generated by all of the districts.
B. Gann Limits in Proposition 4
Proposition 4, an initiative authored by Paul Gann, the co-author
of Proposition 13, fueled the taxpayer revolt spawned by Proposition
13 by establishing constitutional limits on permissible increases in
state and local government spending.143 Proposition 4 imposed an
unreasonable constraint on government funding by initially fixing the
Gann limit inflation factor to the smaller of the annual percentage
change in either the United States Consumer Price Index (CPI) or
can collect annually for general purposes from local property taxes and state
aid. The revenue limit is composed of a base revenue limit - a basic education
amount per unit of ADA computed by formula each year from the previous
year's base revenue limit - and any of the number of revenue limit adjustments
that are computed anew each year." Id. at 222.
137. See id. at5.
138. Seeid. at6.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 6-7.
142. See Fischel, supra note 124, at 611.
143. See GOLDFINGER, supra note 92, at 12.
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California per capita personal income. 144 Under this "whichever is
smaller" provision, the Gann limit allowed inflation growth of only
84% from the 1978-79 base year through the 1989-90 fiscal year.
Yet, California per capita personal income increased by 113% during
that same period. 45 Even though the public school system was fi-
nancially destitute, California elected to rebate surplus state funds to
taxpayers in the 1986-87 fiscal year pursuant to the limits imposed
by Proposition 4.146
Fortunately, the problems inflicted on the public school systems
by Proposition 4 were eliminated in 1988 by Proposition 98, an ini-
tiative sponsored by the educational community. 147 Proposition 98
provided the public schools with "a constitutionally protected portion
of the State Budget."' 48 Moreover, it specified that any future state
fund surplus in excess of the Gann limits would be redirected to-
wards education, instead of being refunded to taxpayers. 
49
Proposition 98 nullified the constraints that the Gann limits had
placed on state spending. 50 To counteract this effect and to reestab-
lish a realistic Gann spending limit, the Legislature placed Proposi-
tion 111 on the June 1990 ballot.15' Proposition 111 authorized the
sole use of California per capita income percentage fluctuations to
compute inflation changes for future years.152 As such, the state's
Gann limit could grow faster, thereby increasing funding for educa-
tion and all other state funded programs.1
5 3
Although Proposition 4 does not presently impact the state's
educational budget, it did affect it during the ten-year period prior to
the passage of Propositions 98 and 111. Accordingly, the goals of
Serrano II during this period were further undermined.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 12-13.
147. See id. at 13.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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C. Individual School District's Ability to Solicit Private Donations
and Approve Special Taxes
Inequalities amongst the school districts are also fostered by the
ability of the more affluent districts to raise additional funding
through the parents of children attending their schools. Since this
luxury cannot be afforded by the poorer districts, the gap between
districts in monies available for educational purposes is further wid-
ened. 154 This fund-raising ability of affluent schools creates further
inequalities across district lines as well as amongst schools within the
same district.
155
For example, Corona Del Mar High School's Parent-Teacher
Association (PTA) normally raises approximately $50,000 by spon-
soring a public tour of glamour homes in Newport Beach.156 In con-
trast, Costa Mesa High School's PTA typically raises only $6,000
through its annual 5K run. 5 7 Although both schools are governed by
Newport-Mesa Unified School District, they are obviously not equal
with respect to monies raised through these extraneous sources.
158
More apparent are the inequalities in the curricula offered by
schools within the same district. For instance, Corona Del Mar ele-
mentary schools supplement their regular faculty with additional
staff that is available throughout the school year. 159 These individu-
als are paid through parent fund-raisers for subjects such as art, sci-
ence, and music.160  Yet, compare this situation to that in Costa
Mesa, where an art teacher at Adams Elementary School is also
compensated by parent fund-raisers. She visits only six times a year
at a cost of $3,000.161 This funding inequality has officials con-
cerned because of the direct correlation between the amount of
money spent on students and their future success. 162 This correlation
is supported by the fact that the students attending Corona Del Mar
154. See Hope Hamashige, State Cuts Create O.C. School Inequalities, L.A.
TIMES (Orange County ed.), Apr. 8, 1996, at Al.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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schools rank higher than students attending Costa Mesa schools on
standardized tests at all grade levels.
163
In addition, only a few districts are prone to vote for special as-
sessments for supplemental educational funding, which require a
two-thirds voter approval under Proposition 13.164 San Francisco
County exemplifies a district achieving the benefits of special taxes
approved by two-thirds or more of its constituency. 16 As such, this
county garnered "a 74% 'YES' vote in 1993" to a 1/4-cent sales tax
increase for schools. 166
D. Disparate Amounts Spent by the School Districts for Non-
Educational Purposes
The annual financial report prepared by the Los Angeles County
Office of Education indicates that enormous disparities exist amongst
the schools concerning expenditures for items such as maintenance
and security. Table 2, infra, illustrates that these disparities have re-
sulted in inequalities amongst the districts with respect to the amount
of funds available for direct educational expenses such as textbooks
and teacher salaries. The data in Table 2 demonstrate that a smaller
portion of the budget remains available for educational purposes in
the neediest and most disadvantaged districts.
1 67
For example, the Acton-Agua Dulce District allots $422.17 per
ADA for books and supplies, but only $21.83 for capital outlay. 
1 68
These spending inequalities are demonstrated by comparing the Ac-
ton-Agua Dulce District with the Long Beach District, which allo-
cates only $212.71 per ADA for books and supplies, and $344.86 per
ADA for capital outlay.
169
163. See id.
164. See GOLDFINGER, supra note 92, at 6-7.
165. See id. at 7.
166. Id.
167. See generally Los ANGELES COuNTY, 1995-96 REPORT, supra note
107, at 138-39, 146-51 tbls.19, 23-25 (ranking the amounts spent by the
schools in Los Angeles County for teachers' salaries, books and supplies, con-
tracted services, and capital outlay).
168. See id. at 146, 150 tbls.23, 25.
169. See id.
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TABLE 2170
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES
DISTRICT TEACHERS' FOR BOOKS FOR CAPITAL
NAME SALARIES PER AND SUPPLIES OUTLAY PER
ADA PER ADA ADA
Beverly Hills $2,820.50 $241.34 $67.70
Santa Monica - $2,196.73 $165.82 $92.21
Malibu
Acton- $422.17 $21.83
Agua Dulce $1,672.44
Long Beach $1,863.78 $212.71 $344.86
Claremont $1,958.94 $153.67 $67.45
Hacienda- $1,765.12 $199.93 $294.30
La Puente
Baldwin Park $1,682.76 $220.60 $70.82
Compton $1,539.31 $194.63 $185.89
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO MINIMIZE THE INEQUALITIES IN
CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
As the foregoing sections suggest, California's current public
school system is in desperate need of restructuring to ensure equality
in education. The following is a proposal to reduce the impact of the
current crisis revolving around educational inequalities.
The first step in achieving this solution is to accept the fact that
complete equality can never be achieved in any aspect of our lives.
Once we concede that we live in a democratic country that promotes
capitalism, we have no choice but to acknowledge that the wealthier
constituents will always be capable of spending more on their chil-
dren's educations by placing them in private schools or by supple-
menting their public education through independent programs. This
Comment rejects the solutions proposed by Serrano I and Serrano II,
which sought to equalize funding amongst the various school
170. Id. at 138, 146, 150 tbls.19, 23 & 25.
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districts, and instead focuses on establishing minimum standards of
education.
As such, our goal should be to provide each and every student
with an education that satisfies the minimum standards promulgated
by the people of the state. This goal can be achieved by passing an
initiative that includes the following provisions:
(1) Creation of a state-wide educational Committee, comprised
of thirteen members, including and headed by the Governor. The
size of the Committee is designed so as not to vest too much power
in a few individuals, and yet to be small enough to reach decisions
efficiently and effectively. The twelve members other than the Gov-
ernor will be nominated and approved by the state legislature so as to
ensure that persons of varied political views are represented.
(2) The Committee members shall be comprised of persons
from various professions, including education, the two United States
senators from California, and at least two lay persons whose children
currently attend the public schools in California. The diverse educa-
tional and professional background of the Committee's members will
assist it in reaching an informed decision on each issue deliberated
upon. Meanwhile, the Governor's function will be limited to at-
tending the meetings without voicing his opinion to ensure that the
other members will not be influenced by it, and to casting the tie-
breaking vote when necessary.
(3) The Committee shall create a uniform educational curricu-
lum for kindergarten through the twelfth grade which meets the new
minimum standards set forth by the Committee. This curriculum
shall include requirements such as the math classes each student
must enroll in at each grade level and will state how many years of
chemistry, physics, English, and biology are to be completed by each
student in order to graduate. The implementation of such a uniform
curriculum in the public schools will ensure that when two students
from different schools graduate, both will have completed the core
classes that the Committee determines are essential for the students'
success in their college years.
The lack of a standardized curriculum was pointed out by E. D.
Hirsch, Jr.,171 who noted that the existence of a coherent curriculum
171. See E. D. HIRSCH, JR., THE SCHOOLS WE NEED AND WHY WE DON'T
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is a myth in the public schools. 172 Hirsch recalls that a school "dis-
trict superintendent... [informed him that] he had mistakenly as-
sumed each of his schools was determining what would be taught to
children at each grade level, but was shocked to find that assumption
entirely false."'173 The superintendent "discovered that no principal
in his district could tell him what minimal content each child in a
grade was expected to learn."'174 The severity of the problem was
demonstrated by an example where Hirsch had "received a letter
from a distraught mother of identical twins in which she complained
that her children had been placed in different classes at the same
school and were learning totally different things."
175
(4) The Committee will provide a list of textbooks and materi-
als for each subject from which the school boards can choose. The
school boards must provide the Committee with a finalized list of
classes, books, and materials that-it will furnish to each student in its
district. This will allow the local school boards a certain degree of
flexibility while at the same time ensuring that only approved text-
books and materials are used.
(5) In conjunction with the State Education Board, the Com-
mittee shall organize standardized testing, which should encompass
the minimum curriculum adopted by the Committee. These stan-
dardized tests shall be administered by independent agencies to all
students of the public schools. No student may proceed to the next
grade level without passing the test administered for their present
level and each teacher will be paid a bonus based on the number of
students in their class that graduate to the next level. The standard-
ized tests will ensure that students are not being allowed to move on
to the next grade without having achieved an appropriate degree of
proficiency for their current grade level. Also, the use of independ-
ent agencies in administering the standardized tests will ensure that
the tests are not administered by those who have a vested interest in
HAVE THEM (1996). E. D. Hirsch, Jr. is a professor at the University of Vir-
ginia, a renowned author, and the "president of the nonprofit Core Knowledge
Foundation, whose grade-by-grade curriculum is followed by more than two
hundred schools in thirty-seven states." Id.
172. See id. at 26.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 26-27.
175. Id. at27.
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the outcome of the results. Finally, by tying teachers' compensation
to the test results of their students, teachers will have an incentive to
focus on the weaknesses of their students during the school year to
ensure that such students perform well on the standardized tests.
(6) The Committee shall make recommendations as to the level
of funding to be provided to each district. Rather than attempting to
equalize funding among the districts, the Committee will focus on
providing each district with the level of funding necessary to achieve
the minimum educational standards. Therefore, a school district with
older facilities in a high crime area requiring more maintenance and
security will be provided with a higher level of funding than a school
district with newer facilities in a lower crime area.
For example, school district A may require $3 million for capital
outlay and security, whereas school district B may require only $1
million for the same purposes. Yet, both districts may require $2
million for direct educational expenses in order to achieve the mini-
mum standards. Therefore, in this example, school district A would
receive $5 million of total funding, while school district B would re-
ceive only $3 million.
The Committee, rather than being fixated on equalizing the total
dollars allocated to the school districts, will focus on providing suffi-
cient amounts to each district in order to implement the minimum
standards. This proposed funding system, while unequal in total
funding per district, is equitable because it attempts to equalize funds
allocated to each district which are actually used for direct educa-
tional expenses, such as books and teacher salaries.
Although this proposal will not completely equalize the standard
of education provided by all public schools, it will nevertheless en-
sure a minimum standard of education for students seeking a public
education in California. Through this minimum standards system,
the state can graduate students who will be equally qualified to take
advantage of the many exceptional public colleges and universities
available to them.
Though the costs of establishing this proposed solution may
seem initially daunting, the indirect costs associated with not imple-
menting such a program will be far greater. For example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in San Francisco Unified School District v.
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Johnson 176 recognized that "[u]nequal education... leads to unequal
job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to par-
ticipate in the social, cultural, and political activities of our soci-
ety."' 177 The court further noted that "the attainment of equal educa-
tional opportunity . . . is beneficial to all students,"
178 and that "
'education is perhaps the most important function of the state and lo-
cal governments .... It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.' "179
VI. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of Serrano I and Serrano II, to achieve equal-
ity in education, has been undermined by a well-intentioned but mis-
guided attempt to equalize funding amongst the various school dis-
tricts. To achieve true equality in the quality of education provided
to each child, it is imperative that the state returns its focus to a de-
termination and implementation of the minimum standards of educa-
tion that are acceptable to us as a state. In our democratic society,
which values capitalism, equality in the amount of money spent on
each child's education will never be achieved. Only by establishing
and implementing minimum educational standards can we avoid the
tremendous costs associated with the increasing number of poorly
educated students our school systems are generating. Unless such
corrective measures are enacted by the California Legislature, the
public can expect to shoulder the cost of more than three generations
of poorly educated students that will be produced by California's
public school system.
Hanif S. P. Hirji*
176. 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971).
177. Id. at 950, 479 P.2d at 676, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
178. Id. (quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710,714 (W.D.N.Y. 1970)).
179. Id. (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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